We study salary negotiations through a field experiment involving over 3,100 job seekers in the U.S. tech sector. We also propose a theoretical model, which we use to interpret the empirical findings and explore welfare and policy implications.

Cullen, Z.; Pakzad-Hurson, B. and Perez-Truglia, R. (2025). Pushing the Envelope: The Effects of Salary Negotiations. NBER Working Paper No. 33903.

     

While U.S. law prohibits employers from disclosing individual compensation, companies often rely on third-party data for salary benchmarking. We study the theoretical and empirical effects of this common but underexplored practice.

Cullen, Z.; Li, S. and Perez-Truglia, R. (2022). What’s My Employee Worth? The Effects of Salary Benchmarking. Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming.

       

Do informal interactions at work—coffee breaks, lunches, and casual chats—boost employees’ chances of promotion? And could these dynamics help explain the gender pay gap? We provide quasi-experimental evidence from a large financial firm.

Cullen, Z. and Perez-Truglia, R. (2023). The Old Boys' Club: Schmoozing and the Gender Gap. American Economic Review, Vol. 113 (7), pp. 1703–1740 (lead article).

         

Bosses earn far more than their subordinates—but are employees aware of these pay gaps? And does awareness affect morale? We answer these questions using a field experiment with 2,060 employees at a major financial institution.

Cullen, Z. and Perez-Truglia, R. (2022). How Much Does Your Boss Make? The Effects of Salary Comparisons. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 130 (3), pp. 766–822.

         

In 2001, Norway implemented online public access to individual tax records. Our study demonstrates that this transparency led Norwegians to compare their own incomes with those of friends and family, and that this comparison influenced their subjective well-being.

Perez-Truglia, R. (2020). The Effects of Income Transparency on Well-Being: Evidence from a Natural Experiment. American Economic Review, Vol. 110 (4), pp. 1019–54.

     

Do workers know how much their colleagues earn? Do they want to? Are they afraid to ask? We explore these questions through a field experiment in a large corporation, shedding light on how salary information spreads.

Cullen, Z. and Perez-Truglia, R. (2023). The Salary Taboo: Privacy Norms and the Diffusion of Information. Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 222, 104890.

       

We study how information flows within households, using an experiment with a representative sample of Germans. The results reveal stark gender differences: wives tend to learn from their husbands, but husbands do not seem to learn from their wives.

Fehr, D.; Mollerstrom, J. and Perez-Truglia, R. (2024). Listen to Her: Gender Differences in Information Diffusion within the Household. Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 239, 105213.

       

Using a revealed-preference approach, we show that U.S. tech workers strongly value remote work—willing to accept an average 25% pay cut to work remotely. Despite this, remote roles don’t offer higher pay.

Cullen, Z.; Pakzad-Hurson, B. and Perez-Truglia, R. (2025). Home Sweet Home: How Much Do Employees Value Remote Work? American Economic Association Papers & Proceedings, Vol. 115, pp. 276–81.

   

We conducted a field experiment with 92,000 contributors to the Democrat and Republican candidates in the 2012 presidential election. We provide causal evidence that individuals feel pressure to align with the political views of their neighbors and show that these partisan interactions exacerbate geographic polarization.

Perez-Truglia, R. and Cruces, G. (2017). Partisan Interactions: Evidence from a Field Experiment in the United States. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 125 (4), pp. 1208–1243.

     

Are people more politically active in echo chambers? We provide causal evidence using administrative data on 45,000 campaign contributors and track how political engagement changes after they move to ideologically similar neighborhoods.

Perez-Truglia, R. (2018). Political Conformity: Event-Study Evidence from the United States. Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 100 (1), pp. 14–28.

     

How different are Republicans and Democrats in their support for redistribution? We combine survey and administrative data to reveal that the partisan divide is narrower than public discourse suggests.

Nathan, B.; Perez-Truglia, R. and Zentner, A. (2022). Is the Partisan Divide Real? Polarization in Preferences for Redistribution. American Economic Association Papers & Proceedings, Vol. 112, pp. 156–62.

     

We provide evidence of self-serving biases in other-regarding behavior: people’s beliefs about others are influenced by their own desire to be selfish, and ambiguity about others' actions plays a key role in enabling selfish behavior. We designed a laboratory game (the “corruption game”) to study this phenomenon.

Di Tella, R., Perez-Truglia, R., Babino, A., Sigman, M. (2015). Conveniently Upset: Avoiding Altruism by Distorting Beliefs About Others’ Altruism. American Economic Review, Vol. 105 (11), pp. 3416–42.

       

Why do people misperceive their true position in the income distribution? Do these misperceptions affect their demand for redistribution? Using a survey experiment, we identify systematic biases in self-assessed income rank, and show that those who overestimate their rank demand more redistribution when informed of their true position.

Cruces, G., Perez-Truglia, R. and Tetaz, M. (2013). Biased Perceptions of Income Distribution and Preferences for Redistribution: Evidence from a Survey Experiment. Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 98, pp. 100–112.

   

In the United States, there are 741 billionaires with a combined net worth of $5.2 trillion. Despite this extreme inequality, billionaires face effective tax rates lower than the average American. Is this due to a lack of public support for taxation, or misperceptions about billionaires' lives and careers? We address these questions using a survey experiment with a sample of 9,000 Americans.

Perez-Truglia, R. and Yusof, J. (2024). Billionaire Superstar: Public Image and Demand for Taxation. NBER Working Paper No. 32712.

 

Some of today’s most heated policy debates — on Brexit, trade wars, climate change abatement, and migration — concern the redistribution of resources between countries. Do individuals in rich countries know how wealthy they are by global standards? Does this affect their policy preferences? We provide experimental evidence from Germany.

Fehr, D.; Mollerstrom, J. and Perez-Truglia, R. (2022). Your Place in the World: Relative Income and Global Inequality. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Vol. 14 (4), pp. 232–68.

         

Are political and charitable contributions substitutes? This study uses two natural experiments with data from the American Red Cross and Federal Election Commission to show political and charitable giving are substitutes.

Yildirim, P.; Simonov, A.; Petrova, M. and Perez-Truglia, R. (2024). Are Political and Charitable Giving Substitutes? Evidence from the United States. Management Science, Vol. 70 (11), pp. 8030–8043.

       

We study the U.S. Catholic clergy abuse scandals and document a significant, long-lasting impacts on religious participation and charitable contributions in affected communities. Using an event-study approach, we estimate causal effects by leveraging the detailed distribution of scandals across space and time.

Bottan, N. and Perez-Truglia, R. (2015). Losing my Religion: The Effects of Religious Scandals on Religious Participation and Charitable Giving. Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 129, pp. 106–119.

       

Using survey experiments, we demonstrate that individuals are more generous toward poor people they perceive as diligent workers. We also show, both theoretically and empirically, that sympathy for the diligent drives demand for workfare programs.

Drenik, A. and Perez-Truglia, R. (2018). Sympathy for the Diligent and the Demand for Workfare. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 153, pp. 77–102.

   

Do perceptions of government spending influence the willingness to pay taxes? We tested this hypothesis through a field experiment conducted in a high-stakes, real-world context, using revealed preferences.

Giaccobasso, M.; Nathan, B.; Perez-Truglia, R. and Zentner, A. (2022). Where Do My Tax Dollars Go? Tax Morale Effects of Perceived Government Spending. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, forthcoming.

       

We assess the impact of a progressive tax reform using a quasi-experimental design based on a major reform in a large Argentine municipality and a large-scale field experiment. Our findings reveal that the reform had significant effects on tax compliance.

Ajzenman, N.; Cruces, G; Perez-Truglia, R.; Tortarolo, D. and Vazquez-Bare, G. (2024). From Flat to Fair? The Effects of a Progressive Tax Reform. NBER Working Paper No. 33286.

     

Why do individuals and firms pay taxes? Is it fear of tax audits? And is that fear rational? We provide evidence from a large-scale field experiment involving 20,000 companies that collectively paid over $200 million in taxes annually.

Bergolo, M.; Ceni, R.; Cruces, G.; Giaccobasso, M. and Perez-Truglia, R. (2023). Tax Audits as Scarecrows: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Vol. 15 (1), pp. 110–153.

         

Households can file tax protests to legally reduce their property taxes. Why do they choose to protest? Using a field experiment and a quasi-experiment, we demonstrate that expected savings and hassle costs significantly influence the decision to file a tax appeal.

Nathan, B.; Perez-Truglia, R. and Zentner, A. (2025). My Taxes are Too Darn High: Why Do Households Protest their Taxes? American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Vol. 17 (1), pp. 273–310.

       

We present novel evidence from a field experiment highlighting the importance of fairness in tax compliance. Our findings show that households are more willing to pay taxes when they believe other households are also contributing their fair share.

Nathan, B.; Perez-Truglia, R. and Zentner, A. (2023). Paying Your Fair Share: Perceived Fairness and Tax Compliance. NBER Working Paper No. 32588.

     

Governments often use shaming penalties, such as publicizing tax delinquents, to achieve policy goals. However, evidence on the effectiveness of these policies is limited. We present findings from a field experiment involving 34,000 tax delinquents who collectively owed half a billion dollars.

Perez-Truglia, R. and Troiano, U. (2018). Shaming Tax Delinquents. Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 167, pp. 120–137.

     

Why do some individuals cheat on their taxes while others do not? Is it due to greater dishonesty or selfishness? We investigate these questions using a unique combination of survey data and administrative records.

Bergolo, M.; Leites, M.; Perez-Truglia, R. and Strehl, M. (2020). What Makes a Tax Evader? NBER Working Paper No. 28235. [Revise & Resubmit, Review of Economics and Statistics.]

     

The study investigates misperceptions about tax audits among firms, using novel survey data. We reveal significant overestimation of audit probabilities but accurate perceptions of penalty rates. Firms with recent audit experiences exhibit the most significant misperceptions.

Bergolo, M.; Ceni, R.; Cruces, G.; Giaccobasso, M.; Perez-Truglia, R. (2018). Misperceptions About Tax Audits. American Economic Association Papers & Proceedings, Vol. 108, pp. 83–87.

   

Home price expectations are pivotal in macroeconomics and finance, yet there is limited direct evidence on how they influence market behavior. We provide novel insights from a large-scale field experiment involving 57,910 U.S. homeowners.

Bottan, N. and Perez-Truglia, R. (2025). Betting on the House: Subjective Expectations and Market Choices. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, Vol. 17 (1), pp. 459–500.

       

We use survey and field experiments to examine the sources of information frictions in inflation expectations. Our findings reveal that while rational inattention explains some misperceptions, cognitive limitations also play a role. Even when accurate statistics are available, households often rely heavily on less precise sources, such as their memories of supermarket prices.

Cavallo, A.; Cruces, G. and Perez-Truglia, R. (2017). Inflation Expectations, Learning and Supermarket Prices: Evidence from Field Experiments. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, Vol. 9 (3), pp. 1–35 (lead article).

         

We investigate how individuals learn from potentially biased statistics through a natural experiment and a survey experiment. Focusing on the period from 2007 to 2015, when the Argentine government manipulated official inflation data, we find that households respond in a sophisticated manner, consistent with a Bayesian learning model, rather than ignoring or blindly accepting the biased statistics.

Cavallo, A.; Cruces, G. and Perez-Truglia, R. (2016). Learning from Potentially Biased Statistics. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2016, pp. 59–108.

 

Do macroeconomic expectations influence consumer decisions? For example, do individuals purchase more durable goods when anticipating higher inflation, or more tradable goods when expecting a currency devaluation? We provide evidence from a field experiment involving around 3,000 credit card customers.

Galashin, M.; Kanz, M. and Perez-Truglia, R. (2020). Macroeconomic Expectations and Credit Card Spending. Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming.

   

We conduct a survey experiment to examine how people select, acquire, and process information. Surprisingly, reducing the cost of information does not reduce the dispersion of expectations. We propose a model of information acquisition and processing to explain this phenomenon.

Fuster, A.; Perez-Truglia, R.; Wiederholt, M. and Zafar, B. (2022). Expectations with Endogenous Information Acquisition: An Experimental Investigation. Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 104 (5), pp. 1059–1078.

       

Do individuals care about their neighbors' earnings? Do they prefer being a big fish in a small pond? We provide revealed-preference evidence from a field experiment involving 1,000 senior medical students in the National Resident Matching Program.

Bottan, N. and Perez-Truglia, R. (2022). Choosing Your Pond: Location Choices and Relative Income. Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 104 (5), pp. 1010–1027.