What's My Employee Worth? The Effects of Salary Benchmarking

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 - Setting the *right* salaries is of first order importance.
- U.S. legislation prohibits employers from sharing information on their employees' compensation with each other.
 - Concerns about coordinating to pay lower salaries.
- Companies are still allowed to use aggregated data (e.g., median salary by position) provided by third parties.
 - Practice known as salary benchmarking.

Research Question

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- **Research Question:** how does salary benchmarking affect pay setting?
 - Implications for how we model/understand labor markets.
 - Relevant for an ongoing policy debate.

Overview of the Paper

- Measure effects of benchmarking using administrative data.
 - Leverage the roll-out of a new benchmarking tool.
 - Event-study analysis for causal identification.
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- Measure effects of benchmarking using administrative data.
 - Leverage the roll-out of a new benchmarking tool.
 - Event-study analysis for causal identification.
 - Suggest significant effects on pay-setting.
- We offer a simple model that:
 - Can explain main findings.
 - Discusses implications for models of the labor market.
 - Discusses policy implications.

Related Literature

 Wage Dispersion. Diamond (1971); Rosen (1986); Krueger & Summers (1988); Murphy & Topel (1990); Mortensen & Pissarides (1994); Burdett & Mortensen (1998); Abowd et al. (1999); Mortensen (2005); Postel-Vinay & Robin (2006); Card et al. (2018); Roussille & Scuderi (2023); etc.

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- Pay transparency. Card et al. (2012); Mas (2017); Perez-Truglia (2020); Cullen & Pakzad-Hurson (2016); Cullen & Perez-Truglia (2018, 2021); Baker et al. (2019); Bennedsen et al. (2019); Caldwell & Harmon (2019); etc.

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- <u>Behavioral Firms.</u> Rounding (Dube et al., 2018); anchoring (Hjort et al., 2020; Hazell et al., 2021); downward rigidities (Grigsby et al., 2021; Kaur, 2019); uniform pricing (DellaVigna & Gentzkow, 2019); etc.

Institutional Context

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- Prominent in HR textbooks too (e.g., Zeuch, 2016).

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 - E.g., Abbott, Langer and Associates, Korn Ferry, Hayes Group, Mercer, Radford, Willis Towers Watson.
- More recently, free online tools became popular.
 - Based on crowd-sourced data.
 - E.g., Glassdoor, Comparably, and LinkedIn,

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 - Well-established company (market cap of around \$100 billion).
- Arguably the best tool on the market.
 - Administrative data (payroll records instead of surveys).
 - Massive sample sizes (650,000 firms and 20 million employees).
 - Highly responsive, due to high-frequency data. Comparison to Free Source

Screenshots of the Salary Benchmarking Tool

Benchmark Job 🗸 Accountant	SAVE SEARCH	
BENCHMARK JOB Accountant JOB DESCRIPTION		BENCHMARK DETAILS Organizations: 16,486 Employees: 57,211
Benchmark Filters All Industries	es 🗸 All Organization Sizes 🗸 All Employee Types 🗸	✓ APPLY CLEAR FILTERS
Map View: States ▼ Search for a City, State or Region NATIONAL MEDIAN BASE SALARY 62,995 ↑ 0.02% ∨ a Previous Year ∨ s National NATIONAL MEDIAN TOTAL CASH COMPENSATION 64,994 ↑ 0.02% ∨ a Previous Year ∨ s National		•

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A Sketch of the Model

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- It is optimal to bid below own valuation.
- Whether to shade bid a little or a lot depends on what the firm thinks about the worker's *market value*.
 - Salary benchmark is useful information!

"Using surveys to benchmark compensation levels ensures that the pay levels determined by the organization are not extraordinarily misaligned with market practice – i.e., pav is not too low or too high. Determining the appropriate amount of compensation is a balancing act. No organization wants to waste their financial resources by paving too high relative to the market; and those who pay too low risk unwanted turnover from employees looking for a better deal elsewhere." – Berger & Berger (2008), p. 125.

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- <u>Prediction 1:</u> Salaries get "compressed" towards the benchmark.
- <u>Prediction 2</u>: The average salary could go up, down, or stay the same.

Data and Research Design


- Payroll Database: detailed payroll records.
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 - When the employee was hired and for what pay.
- Tool Usage Database: search behavior in the benchmark tool.
 - Whether benchmark was "looked up" before the employee was hired.
- <u>Benchmark Database</u>: historical compensation benchmarks.
 - Exact benchmark value shown in the tool.

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- Sample is quite representative of medium and large firms. 👄

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- 534 firms gained access to the tool before 2019-Q4.
- 199 (37.3%) of these firms hired in at least one position during 2019-Q4.
- They looked up the salary for 20.8% of these new hires.

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- Average pre-treatment characteristics similar across three categories.

Most Common Searched Positions

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Position Title	Searched	Non-Searched	Non-Searchable
Bank Teller	539 [12]	287 [24]	1,976 [87]
Customer Service Representative	468 [44]	4,401 [170]	4,012 [385]
Security Guard	286 [6]	139 [44]	6,263 [95]
Hotel Cleaner	208 [2]	379 [5]	1,058 [17]
Hand Packer	155 [4]	234 [17]	1,957 [55]
Patient Care Coordinator	117 [3]	103 [14]	133 [29]
Receptionist	93 [15]	310 [86]	2,911 [238]
Cook	86 [6]	334 [21]	1,606 [85]
Waiter/Waitress	84 [7]	1,113 [18]	2,986 [87]

Non-Searchable: Placebo Onboarding Dates

- Event-study analysis revolves around the onboarding date.
- Challenge: by definition, control firms do not have an onboarding date.
- Solution: assign a "placebo" on-boarding date.
 - Match treatment firm that is most similar in observables.
 - E.g., if Ford gains access but Fiat does not, we assume Fiat would have gained access when Ford did.

Effects on Compression

Searched Positions



Searched Positions



Searched Positions



Non-Searched Positions



Non-Searched Positions



Non-Searchable Positions



Non-Searchable Positions



DiD Specification

$Y_{i,j,t} = \sum_{s \in S} \alpha_{1,s}^k \cdot A_{j,t}^s \cdot T_{i,j} + \sum_{s \in S} \alpha_{2,s}^k \cdot A_{j,t}^s + \alpha_3^k \cdot T_{i,j} + X_{i,j,t} \alpha_4^k + \delta_t^k + \psi^k + \epsilon_{i,j,t}^k$

- $Y_{i,j,t}$: abs. distance to benchmark.
- $T_{i,j}$: dummy for Searched positions.
- $A_{i,t}^s$: event-study dummies for onboarding.
- k = 1: Searched vs. Non-Searchable.
- k = 2: Searched vs. Non-Searched.





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Complementary Survey Experiment

- In the SHRM survey, we embedded a survey experiment.
 - We asked them to choose a salary for a candidate in a position they were looking to fill.
 - We provided (hypothetical) a benchmark.
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 - We measure if they change their salary offer in response to the benchmark.
- Survey results indicate significant compression toward benchmarks.
 - Consistent in direction and magnitude with the results from the natural experiment.

- In HR interviews (Adler, 2020), salary benchmarking seems to play a more prominent role among low-skill workers.
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- 58% of the sample categorized as high-skill.
 - E.g.: Software Developer, Ophthalmic Technician, Production Operations Engineer.

High Skill



Low Skill



Effects on Levels

Searched vs. Non-Searched



Searched vs. Non-Searchable



Low-Skill Salary (Searched vs. Non-Searchable)



Low-Skill Retention (Searched vs. Non-Searchable)



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- We present evidence that firms change salaries in response to benchmark information.
 - Effects are surprising, according to a forecast survey with experts.
- We provide a model that can fit the main facts.
 - Highlight that salary dispersion can be, at least in part, attributed to information frictions.

Policy Implications

- In recent years, the FTC, DOJ and White House have revised their statements and policies about salary benchmarking.
 - Discussion around the trade-off between pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects.

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- While more research is needed, we revised our beliefs in favor of salary benchmarking:
 - Our model formalizes the pro-competitive argument: average salary goes up in equilibrium.
 - Evidence suggests some desirable effects even in partial equilibrium: average salary and retention go up for low-skill positions.